周波：是好意思国叫嚣要在台湾海峡使用核火器，而不是中国大陆

编者按：本年7月，中国发布《中国对于互不最初使用核火器倡议的责任文献》，再次命令“核火器国度采用不最初使用核火器政策，或者晓示互不最初使用核火器”，推动寰球和平程度。

近日，清华大学政策与安全研究中心研究员、中央军委外洋军事合作办公室安全合作中心前主任周波应帕格沃什科学和寰球事务会议（Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs）邀请，就“中国与核裁军”进行线上专题讲座，就“不最初使用核火器”政策的内在逻辑以及具体的可施行措施进行了敷陈。

帕格沃什科学和寰球事务会议是一个由有名学者和内行东说念主物的外洋组织，旨在减少武装冲突带来的危机，寻求处理全球安全威迫的阶梯。1955年《罗素—爱因斯坦宣言》发布，1957年，该组织成立，创建东说念主为约瑟夫·罗特布拉特（Joseph Rotblat）和伯特兰·罗素，创速即点为加拿大帕格沃什。罗特布拉特与帕格沃什科学和寰球事务会议因在核裁军上的努力而取得了1995年诺贝尔和平奖。

不雅察者网和北京对话受权翻译、发布讲座全文如下：

【翻译/李泽西 核译/韩桦】

周波：谢谢彼得·詹金斯大使。今天能与诸位帕格沃什成员交流我深感侥幸。我要至极感谢我在剑桥大学圣·埃德蒙学院就读期间的院长布莱恩·希普爵士在感染新冠的情况下在线出席。

今天我将计议一些与核火器和中国估量的议题。最初，咱们是否依然过问了一个新的核期间？让我援用周恩来总理接受法国记者采访时的回答。其时记者问，“若何看待法国大立异”？据说他的申诉是，“现鄙人论断为时太早”。

那么，咱们是否依然过问了一个新的核期间？谜底亦是如斯。但如果一些核武国度，比如好意思国，从头启动核测验——前好意思国国度安全咨询人奥布莱恩等个别好意思国东说念主饱读励特朗普，如果再次当选，就开展核测验——那么其他国度肯定会效仿。到那时，咱们不错肯定地说，核试爆的震荡将标志着新的核期间开启。

让我先来谈谈欧洲爆发核斗争的可能性以及中国对此的态度。

好意思国中央谍报局分析认为，乌克兰发生核斗争的概率为50%。诚然咱们不肯定改日会若何发展，但凭证CSIS（好意思国政策与外洋研究中心）的统计，俄罗斯率领层在计议乌克兰冲突时依然有200次提到使用核火器。流毒问题是，俄罗斯的估量说法有几分厚爱？

日前，普京总统下令修改了核政策，基本上是镌汰了核火器的使用门槛：只消俄罗斯和白俄罗斯碰到旧例火器攻击，且这种攻击对主权组成要紧威迫，即可使用核火器。但何为“要紧威迫”并莫得明确的界说，这就激发了新的问题：什么样的情况才算是要紧威迫？

我个东说念主认为，相对而言，俄罗斯在某些情况下更有可能动用核火器，比如说，如果他们面对失去克里米亚的威迫。但是在现风光面下，这种可能性并不大。

另一种情况是俄罗斯失去依然在宪法上晓示为其邦畿的四个（乌克兰）东南部地区，自然各方对于他们是否能够完全掌控这四个地区，仍存在着不同观点。

我认为最准确的回答是，没东说念主知说念斗争若何收尾。我也曾与一位乌克兰大使交谈，她说了一句话让我印象久了。我问她，斗争会连续多久？她回答说念：“咱们的孙辈们会连接战斗。”我不知说念这是否会成真，但那是她的原话。

因此，这是第二种可能性。但还有第三种可能性可能最为实践，那即是，当红线看似不再存在时，局面最为危机。我指的是，在好意思国的复旧下，装备西方武装的乌克兰，正少许点浸透俄罗斯境内战斗。尽管这是斗争初期的红线，但这条红线似乎不复存在了。

当地时候2022年2月24日，普京总统晓示，俄罗斯武装部队将开展一项至极军事行动。图为当日克里米亚的俄罗斯军用卡车驶近乌克兰边境视觉中国

接下来咱们望望北约彭胀的情况。我与许多西方东说念主士交流过，他们不认为北约彭胀是俄罗斯决定与乌克兰发生冲突的主要原因，但我信服这是其中的流毒。本体上，俄罗斯的警戒并不始于普京总统，这不错记忆到苏联时期。从戈尔巴乔夫到叶利钦再到普京，俄方率领齐曾发出雷同的警戒。

那普京与前任有什么不同呢？我认为他是阿谁决定不再容忍的东说念主。乌克兰的最拆伙局会若何？面前下论断还为前锋早，但我认为最有可能的结果是雷同于朝鲜半岛的息兵协议。不外，这种息兵协议可能会愈加脆弱，因为其中一方是寰球上核武储备最多的五常之一。

我能揣测俄罗斯改日会若何行动，他们会哄骗核微辞政策，或者可能在改日几十年发出愈加严厉的核威迫。为什么会这样呢？原因很简便，因为俄罗斯的旧例兵力较之于冷战时期依然大幅减弱。1982年他们曾晓示不最初使用核火器，1993年烧毁了这一承诺，因为苏联解体后，俄罗斯的旧例实力已不如从前。

那么，中国的情况若何呢？最初，我想谈一下中国与俄罗斯的关系，它被称为“无上限伙伴关系”，这引起了通盘西方寰球的担忧。

但对我来说，这种“无上限伙伴关系”只是是中国但愿与其最大邻国竖立友谊的一种自然刻画风光。试想一下，如果我说我想与你竖立友谊，但随即声明，咱们的友谊必须有限制，你会何如想？让我再给你一个例子。当咱们与巴基斯坦东说念主交谈时，他们常会说中巴友谊比喜马拉雅山还高，比阿拉伯海还深，比蜜糖还甜。你会何如作念？你可能会浅笑，也许还会点头，因为你知说念他们并莫得坏心。

第二点是，中国并不是北约所称的“俄罗斯的决定性复旧者”。我知说念西方对中国出口许多可能具有军民两用的商品动怒。但对于两用产物，咱们最初必须假定这些产物先是民用的，而非军用的。就像汽油和自然气，没东说念主会把它们视为军用产物。但是，如果将汽油加注到军用卡车上，它们就可能更动为军用产物。因此当某物被认为是军民两用时，咱们应该最初假定它是民用的。

中国确乎加大了对俄罗斯的出口，部分原因是受到制裁的俄罗斯但愿从其他地区加多入口，部分原因是中国的经济增速不如从前，中国自然但愿加多出口。但这些出口并莫得违抗任何外洋协议。

对于俄罗斯使用核火器的问题，我认为中国无论是普通大家照旧率领层的格调齐很明确。我曾在英国《金融时报》上发表过一篇著述，终末写说念：总统先生，不要使用核火器！我知说念中俄之间关系友好，但我也了了，中国几十年以来一直坚毅不移的政策是“不最初使用核火器，分歧无核国度和地区使用核火器”。

当地时候2024年3月18日，连合国安迎接就核裁军和防扩散问题举行公开会。中方代表暗意，中国不参加任何形势的核武备竞赛，并命令外洋社会协力鼓动核裁军与核不扩散程度。

2022年11月，习近平主席对访华的德国总理朔尔茨暗意，在欧洲不成使用核火器。朔尔茨的访华受到了某些东说念主的月旦，但他归国后暗意，单是为了达成这个（不使用核火器）共鸣，他的访华亦然值得的。

接下来，我想说一下2022年连合国五个常任理事国在俄乌冲突之前发布的连合声明。这是一个源于冷战时期的老标语：核斗争打不赢，也打不得。但最专诚旨的是，当习近平主席2023年3月访谒俄罗斯时，在斗争期间，中俄再次发表了包含这一句话的连合声明。

我认为，中国一直在努力劝说俄罗斯不要使用核火器。不然何如会有这样的连合声明呢？因此，这意味着中国确乎在努力为欧洲的和平与安逸作念出积极孝顺。咱们不知说念俄罗斯是否会使用核火器。但我认为，中国、印度和巴西的格调对俄罗斯而言是有重量的，我也但愿这些国度的不雅点能领略作用。

是以我认为，面前普京总统可能是俄罗斯率领层中最千里着从容的东说念主，因为他在被俄罗斯学者卡拉加诺夫问及俄罗斯是否应该使用核火器时，否定了这种可能性。

接下来，我想谈谈中国的核当代化。据报说念，中国面前领有500枚核弹头，而凭证五角大楼的说法，中国筹画在2035年之前将这一数目加多到1500枚。在中国，莫得东说念主会证实这个数字，因为它被视为巧妙。

不外，即便这个数字是真的，中国的核武库仍然远远小于好意思国和俄罗斯，两国的核弹头数目均朝上5000枚。对中国而言，加多核火器数目无论是从时间上照旧经济上齐简便，因为中国掌执了估量时间，况兼是全球最强劲的工业国。中国的经济限制也至少是俄罗斯的十倍。

那么，是什么阻截中国领有更多核弹头呢？我认为，主要原因在于中国不想卷入核武备竞赛，而这也在中国的国防预算中得到了很好的体现。为什么这样说呢？因为在外洋关系中，有两样东西是不会骗东说念主的。最初，地舆不会说谎。你的行动会受到地舆环境的极大收尾，比如执政鲜半岛。

东说念主们常常计议朝鲜可能发起核攻击，但咱们也要议论到，朝鲜半岛的通盘长度仅为1200公里。既然任何核辐射彰着会留传执政鲜半岛，那么究竟在什么情况下，朝鲜率领层会发动自戕性的核攻击呢？其次，国防预算也不会说谎。无论你是否加多国防预算，这齐会充分反馈出一个国度对地缘环境、自我才智、敌手或敌东说念主才智的评估。

中国的国防预算在昔时四十年里一直保持在2%以下。本体上，大多数时候，中国国防预算以致唯有GDP的1.5%附近或更低。这充分反馈出中国的自信心，标明中国对自身、地区乃至中好意思关系的信心。中国的信心至关蹙迫，因为如果中国综合这种信心，或者像印度和日本那样急剧加多国防预算，那么通盘亚太地区将会堕入庞杂。

接下来，我想说明一下中国“把自身核力量保管在国度安全需要的最低水平”的含义。这在几份中国的国防白皮书中齐有提到。最低水平究竟是多低呢？我个东说念主的意会，要确保的是，即便中国晓示了不最初使用核火器，其他核火器国度也不敢对中国发动先下手为强核打击。这就要求中国具备弥漫的威慑力量。

家喻户晓，最近中国向南太平洋辐射了洲际弹说念导弹。这意味着什么？诚然中国媒体莫得线路太多细节，但我信赖这增强了中国东说念主民对其部队的信心，也展示了中国的军事才智。此外，这标明中国必须对其武装力量进行当代化诞生。我认为当代化不单是意味着擢升新的才智，还包括合理加多火器数目。不然，如果数目莫得变化，那本体上只是在进行爱护。

中国的辐射行径已提前奉告好意思国，而好意思国对此暗意了肯定。这让我不禁想考：将来好意思国事否也会奉告中国其核行径或洲际弹说念导弹辐射情况？毕竟，中好意思两国依然签署了对于要紧军事行径的互通协议。那么，什么算是要紧军事行径？自然，中国的洲际弹说念导弹辐射是其中之一。那么，好意思国会不会提前奉告中国其在南海的行动？或者说，是否会奉告中国估量舰船将通过台湾海峡的情况？

接下来，我想计议台湾海峡发生核斗争的可能性。中国政府依然在强长入平归拢。以致好意思国国防部长奥斯汀在香格里拉对话会上也暗意，斗争既不是近在咫尺，也不是不可幸免的，我对此感到爽直，因为这径直否定了好意思国一些将军对于中国将在2025年或2027年攻台的说法。毕竟，奥斯汀的言论应该是基于巨擘的信息和谍报作念出的。

咱们不可能对台湾东说念主民使用核火器，这确切是不可联想的。但是，有一些好意思国东说念主，比如前国防部部长帮办柯伯吉，以及一些智库，如大泰西理事会，饱读励好意思国在台湾海峡最初使用核火器的问题，原因在于他们认为好意思国在旧例斗争中正逐步处于颓势。我对此的观点是，咱们必须让好意思国烧毁这个乖谬的想法。

为此，我认为咱们应该加多一些核火器，这样，在一场好意思国不敢对中国最初使用核火器的旧例斗争中，咱们能取得到手。

接下来，有两个对于中国核政策的常见扭曲。第一个是，中国不肯意计划核裁军。你可能别传过许多估量说法。但我认为，这本体上取决于你想与中国计议什么。为何不计议中国提议的“不最初使用核火器”的政策？中国会相等乐意计划这个问题。

当地时候2024年9月15日，俄罗斯符拉迪沃斯托克，俄罗斯舟师“潘捷列耶夫舟师上将”号落幕舰(右)参加了在日本海举行的俄罗斯太平洋舰队和中国东说念主民解放军舟师战船参加的“大洋-2024”政策率领和照看舟师演习。视觉中国

但是，如果你想借此窥视中国核当代化或发展的速率和限制，可能会感到失望。因为中好意思如果要计议核裁军，两国需要大致势均力敌，因此要么中国需要大幅加多核火器库存，要么好意思国需要大幅减少其核库存，这两者齐不太可能。第二个扭曲则是好意思国最近提议的、最乖谬的《核部署指南》。报说念称，好意思军可能需要为俄罗斯、中国和朝鲜的“合作查抵御”作念好准备。

我的问题是，中国、俄罗斯和朝鲜何时和谐过使用核火器？我确切无法想起中国和朝鲜部队何时有过连合演习，遑论可能波及核火器方面的合作？这种想法太猖獗了。基于这种乖谬的分析来制定政策确切是毫相当性而言。

接下来，我想谈谈我对中好意思政策安逸的观点。冷战期间的政策安逸主若是指核火器之间的平衡，但我认为在中好意思之间，咱们不错罢了一种更频频的政策安逸，这不仅包括核弹头的数目，还不错涵盖新兴规模，举例网罗、东说念主工智能和天际。

我信赖中好意思不错在这三个规模进行对话，因为两边在这些规模的差距并不大。我在《酬酢事务》上发表的著述中提到，在网罗安全规模，咱们应该交换一份敏锐盘算推算清单，确保在职何情况下齐不攻击这些盘算推算。在东说念主工智能规模，咱们应确保完全的东说念主类限制，尤其是在核率领和限制系统上。在外天际，咱们应探讨袒护在天际部署火器的可能性，正如中国和俄罗斯所提议的那样。同期，咱们也不错计议西方提议的门径和负包袱步履的问题。

接下来，我想终末说明为什么我认为中国提议的“不最初使用核火器”政策是统统核火器国度齐不错接受的。这是我最近在《酬酢政策》杂志上发表过的不雅点。最初，在计议核裁军时，有两个前撮要求。第一，近期内袒护核火器是不可能的。我知说念在2017年，非核火器国度提议了袒护核火器的协议，但莫得任何核火器国度会但愿面前就袒护核火器。

因此，这少许是不可行的。再者，在竞争日益强烈的情况下，核火器国度也不可能但愿减少我方核火器的储备。正如我刚才提到的，中国也可能需要合理地加多核弹头数目。但是，我信赖在这两个前提下，“不最初使用”看起来是镌汰核威迫的最实践的方法。

逻辑相等简便：即使你承诺不最初使用，它也不会减弱你的还击才智，同期你将站上说念德高地。另一个原因是，流程一些研究，我发现好意思国、英国和法国的核政策，本体上与中国的“不最初使用”政策并莫得太大的差距。接下来让我一一说明这些国度的情况。

举例，好意思国最近的核政策有所变化，但直到2022年，好意思国核态势评估暗意只会议论在极点情况下使用核火器，以捍卫好意思国偏激盟友和伙伴的要紧利益。

令我困惑的是一个流毒字：“要紧利益”。我无法联想，好意思国的什么利益或盟友的什么利益会要求好意思国最初使用核火器。好意思国不是依然最初使用过核火器吗？有哪些利益对好意思国如斯蹙迫，以至于好意思国需要最初使用核火器，尤其议论到好意思国领有最强劲的旧例部队和数目弥远的核弹头？我知说念好意思国的盟友对此感到担忧，他们但愿好意思国提供核保护神。但让我回到之前提到的例子，咱们来谈谈朝鲜。

朝鲜时往往会发出威迫，但他们真的发动核攻击的可能性有多大呢？任何一方执政鲜半岛使用核火器齐是自戕步履，因为会留住放射性尘埃。因此，正确的问题是，在什么情况下，朝鲜会决定自戕？谜底是，除非他们信赖我方再也无法糊口，但愿与敌东说念主鸡飞蛋打。若议论朝鲜率领层的这一动机，咱们就无谓顾虑他们会最初使用核火器来攻击他国。

英国的核政策与好意思国相等相似，因为英国也只会在自卫的极点情况下议论使用核火器。法国则承诺免除“够用即可”原则。总而言之，我得出的论断是，这些国度的核政策本体上与中国的核政策并莫得太大诀别。

最大的挑战是若何让俄罗斯参与其中。本体上，我认为俄罗斯的“先升级后左迁”政策在乌克兰冲突中是有用的，因为到面前为止，好意思国依然对乌克兰使用其提供的火器设定了一些收尾。

那么，俄罗斯若何才能烧毁现时作念法，承诺不最初使用核火器呢？因为这种政策存在一种窘境，因为“先升级后左迁”的策略取决于他东说念主对威迫的感受与担忧。流毒在于，如果东说念主们感受到威迫，他们可能会感到胆寒。但是，如果你真的使用核火器，你就无法限制敌手的报复限制，这种以牙还牙的风险可能演变为无东说念主但愿发生的全面核斗争。对俄罗斯来说，这可能会导致北约的介入，这是莫斯科最顾虑的事情。

因此我个东说念主建议一种双制度。最初，在欧洲方面，我建议北约采用两个才略。第一步，北约不错对俄罗斯片面作出不最初使用核火器的承诺，作念出一种善意的姿态。北约真的想要对俄罗斯最初使用核火器吗？完全不敢。是以，他们不错作念出这样的承诺。通过这一善意的姿态，不错缓解弥留局面。

第二步可能对北约来说有点难以接受，但仍是不错实施的。北约不错承诺罢手进一步彭胀，以换取俄罗斯接受不最初使用核火器的政策。北约可能会问：如果其他国度但愿加入，咱们为什么要隔断彭胀？我的不雅点是，俄罗斯的步履至少有北约彭胀的身分，诚然这并不是一起头因，但确乎是原因之一，因为俄罗斯率领东说念主对此反复说起。

从另一个实践的角度来看，面前唯有三个国度在恭候加入北约：波黑、格鲁吉亚和乌克兰。这三国与俄罗斯的关系齐较为复杂。因为但愿加入北约，格鲁吉亚依然经验过一场斗争，而乌克兰正处于斗争中。因此，即使这三个国度加入北约，带来的费劲也多于公道。而且本体上莫得太多国度在恭候加入北约。因此，我认为这在北约的可接受范围内。

至于亚洲，因为中国和俄罗斯关系友好，两国已就不最初使用核火器达成共鸣。如果中国和好意思国也能达成雷同协议，将有助于减少与包括好意思国盟友在内的潜在冲突。

因此流毒在于，中国和好意思国事否能够达成雷同的协议。有东说念主可能会以为我过于机动，竟然信赖好意思国会快乐这样的姿态。但我并不认为这是胡想乱想，咱们不错从历史中得到启示。1998年，印度和巴基斯坦进行了核测验。没过多久，中国和好意思国赶快达成了一项荒野的协议，展现了两个核大国之间的勾搭，即罢手将互相的核火器对准对方。两年后，连合国五个常任理事国于2000年齐达成了核火器互不对准协议。

这一协议的蹙迫性在于，它传递了核火器国度对寰球核裁军的善意信号。诚然意旨有限，但至少它是有标志意旨的。但是，“互不对准”的问题是无法进行核查。你何如能知说念我是否在对准俄罗斯或好意思国呢？但我信赖，不最初使用核火器自然是该协议的下一才略。想想看，如果核火器互不对准了，下一步是什么？自然是不最初使用。我不认为不最初使用核火器只是理论承诺。有些东说念主可能会说，中国倡导不最初使用核火器只是一种酬酢伎俩。

那么，我想夸张点说，为什么咱们不齐遴荐这个“酬酢伎俩”呢？这将酿成一种说念德拘谨。互不对准无法核查，但是若是你最初使用了核火器，东说念主东说念主齐看得到！不最初使用核火器的承诺对全寰球故意。终末，既然统统五常国度齐快乐“核斗争打不赢”，那么咱们为什么不成承诺不最初使用核火器呢？我就说到这里。如果有任何问题我会悉力回答。谢谢。

问答关节

听众一：我强烈快乐“不最初使用核火器”确乎是逻辑上的下一步。但我怀疑好意思国事否自得参与这一逐步鼓动的程度。

在欧洲，公众公论在乌克兰问题上似乎更倾向于复旧通过谈判收尾斗争，而政事率领东说念主却朝着相背地点行动。

让我举一个例子。最近欧洲议和会过了一项决议，我援用一下，它命令“以一切可能的风光复旧乌克兰取得到手”。在我看来，这是以一种可怕的风光去命令连续斗争。

您认为好意思国利益是否驱动其连续乌克兰斗争？我认为好意思国的态度有两个原因。一是为了阻截中国、欧洲和俄罗斯之间酿成集团，因为从永恒来看，这个集团可能忘形国强劲得多。

同期，出于相同的办法，好意思国还试图繁芜德国与俄罗斯之间的关系，并挑起俄罗斯与中国之间的不良关系。

周波：谢谢，我知说念既有东说念主快乐，也有东说念主反对你的不雅点。

举例，《纽约时报》的专栏作者保罗・克鲁格曼认为，复旧乌克兰不会破耗太多，但也有其他东说念专揽相背的不雅点。我认为面前好意思国很难找到处理有盘算推算，因为它本体上卷入了两场斗争。好意思国认为中国事“紧追不舍的威迫”，是以他们想要点聚焦中国。这两场仗无疑会溜达他们的防范力。

是以我不认为他们但愿斗争连接下去，但正如我之前所说，莫得东说念主知说念若何收尾这场斗争。

帕格沃什驻日内瓦主任巴萨诺夫：这是一场极其兴味的申辩。我永远复旧“不最初使用核火器”的原则，我光显在罢了这个想法的说念路上存在许多困难。就在奥巴马离开白宫前的终末几个月，他曾试图以此改动好意思国的政策。东说念主们渊博认为他失败了，因为好意思国的友邦反对这一想法。

面前，我的分析是好意思国军方安排好意思国一些最亲密的友邦反对奥巴马的上述努力。

我认为咱们需要议论多样身分，包括新的身分，以便在不最初使用核火器方面取得进展，处理更多问题，奠定坚实或更可靠的基础，包括你提到的中好意思之间政策安逸的蹙迫身分，即东说念主工智能、天际等规模。

我强烈认为，新的规模、新的才智或非核火器、非核力量正在成为一个越来越需要处理的蹙迫身分。

有少许我需要改造，俄罗斯对于在乌克兰使用核火器的申辩是一种诞妄的刻画。基本上除了一些傻子，包括率领层的傻子之外，莫得东说念主说起在乌克兰使用核火器。问题是若何阻截北约的径直介入。我认为咱们需要鼓动 “不最初使用核火器” 的理念。咱们需要启动厚爱计议这些想法若何运作，通过二轨酬酢启动。令东说念主缺憾的是，一轨酬酢存在很大的阻遏。我不是说不可能罢了摧毁，但确乎存在阻遏，况兼有必要明确利益、温雅、盘算推算、才略、阻遏等等。谢谢。

周波：谢谢你的长篇挑剔。因为你莫得提议问题，是以我就不回复了。

专揽东说念主：相等感谢。来自蒂莫西・赖特的两个问题。“不最初使用核火器”协议是否包括签署国在兵力态势方面的改动？举例，列国连接保持接到警戒就辐射态势；核斗争仍可能因这种误算或偶但是发生。是以问题是，你是否定为有（不最初使用的）政事声明就弥漫了？其次，中国说它不会参与核武备竞赛，却在加多核火器平台和输送器用的数目。是以他认为统统迹象齐标明中国将连接扩大其才智，那么这与中国的态度相符吗？

周波：好的，让我先回答第二个问题。最初，我认为中国加多核火器数目（如简直的发生的话）幅度不会很大，因此这不应该被视为核武备竞赛。是的，领有更多核火器，正如我所说，这也意味着中国需要使其核力量当代化，因为中国但愿使其统统兵种当代化，而火箭军亦然其中之一。

面前让我往来答第一个问题。如果统统国度齐承诺不最初使用核火器，本体上，你将我方置于全寰球东说念主民的监督之下，东说念主们会看你是否真的能战胜承诺。如果统统有核国度齐说我不会最初使用，那么这将能饱读舞无核国度。想想看，核火器国度，尤其是好意思国这样一个最强劲的国度，为什么需要最初使用核火器?

如果一群弱小艰辛的国度之间结好以自卫，我不错意会。但如果是寰球上最强劲的国度之间结好，那么我就无法意会。如果你是最强劲的国度，东说念主们知说念攻击你的遵守，因为你有弥漫的报复才智。那么为什么你不成承诺不最初使用核火器呢？这不会镌汰你的报复才智。这即是我的不雅点。

我也知说念面前方国要接受不最初使用核火器的政策本体上有多困难。但我信赖，一朝政事要求熟练，就可能会有合适的时候。2000年咱们快乐核火器互不对准对方之前，好意思国也有东说念主说，这何如可能实践呢？咱们议论的是对方的才智，而不是意图，因为意图整夜之间就能改动。但是，印巴核测验为核大国提供了一个契机，核大国必须进展出勾搭，必须标明反对核测验，因为这种反对的态度相宜《不扩散核火器协议》。

不扩散核火器协议Wikipedia

专揽东说念主：咱们还有一些问题。安德鲁的问题是，如果一个恐怖组织设备出核火器并威迫到任何一个寰球大国，会发生什么？“不最初使用”政策在这种情况下会若何领略作用？大卫问说念，为了罢了“不最初使用” 政策，你认为中国不错或应该向好意思国在东亚的盟友提供哪些保证？

周波：对于恐怖分子的问题。第一个问题是，他们有核火器吗？或者他们会最初使用核火器吗？如果他们最初使用核火器，你进行报复是完全合理的，对吧？但是真确的问题在于，你若何用核火器报复一群很容易避让在某个难以被探伤到的地方的恐怖分子呢？

让咱们谈谈东亚与中国。在职何情况下，中国会对任何国度最初发动核攻击吗？中国声称对南海的很大一部分领有主权，但到面前为止，中国根底莫得对东南亚的任何国度发出过使用武力的威迫。中国以致正在与东盟谈判南海步履准则。相同兴味，为什么中国会想用核火器攻击无核的日本呢？你很难举出一个例子来说明中国有对东亚任何国度使用核火器的意图。

我给出的独一例子是对于朝鲜，我认为，即使朝鲜往往地用猖獗言论发出威迫。但本体上，任何核火器的辐射，即使是微型战术核弹，齐是自戕步履，因为朝鲜半岛太小了。尽管有这样的言辞，但除非他们想自戕，不然他们很难作念出这个决定。独一的问题是他们为什么想自戕呢？谜底是除非他们认为我方无法再糊口下去，他们想与你鸡飞蛋打。

听众二：谢谢。您能挑剔一下你们和朝鲜之间的关系吗？

周波：各方就朝鲜率领东说念主是否感性有许多争论。但是如果你望望昔时20年发生的事情，我认为不错说朝鲜走边际政策很成效，对吧？走边际政策需要多数的整个，这不是一件容易作念到的事情，就像是在走钢丝。是以我认为朝鲜率领东说念主是感性的。

听众三：谢谢。我顾虑的是，在波及台湾的冲突中，冲突压力是否会朝上使用核火器的界限，以致咱们仍然可能面对核战，至极议论到非政策核火器。

周波：中国有具备核才智的中程导弹。这是事实。但中国仍然承诺不最初向任何国度使用核火器。

咱们把台湾东说念主民称为本族。咱们何如会对咱们称为“台湾本族”的东说念主民使用核火器呢？是以这是完全不可联想的。我不信赖会有这样的景色，但危机的是我刚才所说的。一些好意思国东说念主，比如前国防部部长帮办以及一些智库公开叫嚣要好意思国在台湾海峡使用核火器。

面前，你不错很容易地在网上搜索到这些信息。从历史上看，好意思国东说念主曾计划过对中国使用核火器。是以在这少许上我必须进行相比：当西方计划俄罗斯时，他们发怵俄罗斯会使用核火器；但当他们计划中国时，似乎他们并不发怵中国较小限制的核武库。相背，他们计划对中国东说念主最初使用核火器。是以对中国东说念主来说，简便的逻辑是咱们必须加多咱们的核武库。对咱们来说，正如我之前提到的，这只需要一个政事决定。是以我想说，中国手脚寰球上最强劲的工业国度，西方国度真的应该为中国到面前为止如斯克制而运道。

听众四：如果咱们确乎快乐了一项全球不最初使用核火器政策，或者以致是中好意思之间的双边不最初使用核火器政策，那会何如样呢？在统统核国度齐快乐一项不最初使用核火器政策之后，你认为下一步应该采用什么措施来进一步鼓动呢？

其次，若何对无核国度提供颓落安全保证？不最初使用核火器在其中起到什么作用呢？

周波：尽管我提议了这个建议，认为贞洁绝顶有一线渴望，但是但愿之光很微小，并不解亮。是的，对咱们来说作念到这少许很困难，尽管我信赖这是正确的事情，况兼对统统有核国度来说齐是可行的。

之后，我认为咱们必须计议前进的说念路，因为全面核裁军是东说念主类的盘算推算。

让我再给你举个例子。我刚刚简要提到了咱们在外天际的竞争。中国和俄罗斯暗意不在外天际部署任何火器。我认为这很专诚旨。咱们在地球上不是依然有弥漫多的火器了吗？为什么还要在轨说念上放手火器呢？还有什么东说念主类的愚蠢步履比在天际放手火器来攻击我方的星球、我方的家园更严重呢？

但是好意思国和西方国度认为不在轨说念上部署任何火器是不可能的。但我仍然信赖不部署火器是可能的，因为迄今西方国度也莫得把他们部署在天际的东西刻画为火器。

如果普通大家认为咱们在外天际莫得任何火器，那么怨恨将会浅显得多。中国和俄罗斯的提议是基于《月球协议》的，这是从《月球协议》上前迈出的一步，该协议袒护在月球上部署任何火器。如果你们不在月球上部署任何火器，那又为什么要在轨说念上的任何地方部署火器呢？如果不是因为好意思国对完全霸权的渴慕，它又为何要这样作念呢？

听众五：我以为中国的邻居们顾虑的不单是是中国的核火器，更是中国巨大的经济实力、重大的部队，以及我认为的一种彭胀主义格调，比如想要限制南海。不详这阻截了好意思国晓示不最初使用核火器的政策，因为它们想保留阻截或扼制中国的权益，比如说，驻扎中国彭胀并占领好意思国盟友的邦畿。你何如看？

周波：最初，对包括我在内的任何一个中国东说念主来说，中国经济的兴盛发展确乎是一件善事。中国的军事力量确乎在不休增长，这是毫无疑问的。但如果你谈到南海问题，中国并莫得袭击任安在南海的解放飞翔船只。每年有大致十万艘船在南海通行。你可曾听到过这些船只中有任何一艘挟恨中国袭击了飞翔解放吗？是的，中国与一些东友邦家存在邦畿争端，但东说念主们健忘一件事。这些声索国之间自己也存在疏浚的声索。是以问题不单是存在于中国和东友邦家之间，问题在于中国看起来比这些国度要大得多。大让东说念主以为敬畏，小让东说念主以为可儿。东说念主们可爱小的东西，包括小黄瓜、小番茄。这是东说念主类的本能，而不是感性。这是我能给出的独一原因。

Zhou Bo：Thank you，Ambassador Peter Jenkins. This is indeed a great honor for me to talk to distinguished Pugwash members. I'm especially grateful that my master of St Edmund’s College Sir Brian Heap is also present，particularly because he actually is suffering from COVID.

Today，I'm going to talk on a few aspects that are nuclear and China-related. The first question is，are we already in another nuclear age? Let me quote what late Premier Zhou Enlai said when he was asked by a French journalist，“what do you think of the French revolution?” His answer was reportedly“ it is too early to tell”. Then，have we entered into a new cold war? Again，probably it is also too early to tell. But if we would have nuclear weapon states like United States to kick off nuclear tests，as suggested by a number of Americans，including former American national security adviser Robert O’brien，who encouraged Trump to conduct a nuclear test should he become reelected，I am very much sure it will be followed by others. Then we definitely can say the big bangs of nuclear test herald the dawn of another nuclear age.

Let me first talk about the possibility of a nuclear war in Europe and China’s position. According to CIA’s estimate，the chance of a nuclear war in Ukraine is at 50 %. We don't know exactly what might happen， but according to CSIS，there are over 200 cases of Russian leadership referring to use of nuclear weapon in the context of the war in Ukraine. The question is，how serious are Russians? What we are seeing is that a few days ago，President Putin has ordered change of nuclear doctrine. Basically，that means lowering the threshold. The nuclear weapons might be used in response to an attack on Russia and Belarus using conventional weapons，if the attack poses a crucial threat to sovereignty. This kind of description about crucial threat to sovereignty actually is ambiguous，because then comes the question- What is crucial threat?

I personally believe there are a few situations in which Russia might be more likely to use nuclear weapons. One is，if they might lose Crimea，which is not quite possible in the current circumstance.

And then if they lose the four Southeastern regions that are already declared to be Russian territory under Russia’s constitution. Of course，there is a huge debate as to whether they could have full control of the four regions or not.

I believe the right answer is，nobody knows how the endgame looks like. Once I had a conversation with a Ukrainian ambassador who said something that really impressed me. I asked how long will the war last? She said “our grandchildren will continue to fight”. I don't know whether that is true or not，but that is what she said. So this is the second possibility，but the last one probably looks most real. That is when a red line no longer looks like a red line. I believe that is the time when the situation is most dangerous. I'm referring to Ukraine fighting deeper and deeper into the Russian territory using the weapons provided by the West. If that is the red line in the beginning，it no longer looks like a red line.

Then let's look at what has happened about the NATO expansion. I have talked to many people in the West. They don't believe that NATO’s expansion is the very reason that Russia decided to have a conflict with Ukraine，but I believe it is. In fact，warnings from Russia do not start from President Putin. It came from the Soviet time. It came from Mikhail Gorbachev down to Boris Yeltsin to President Putin. And what makes Putin different? He's the man who said enough is enough. So how the endgame in Ukraine would look like? It's too early to tell，but I assume the biggest possibility is a kind of armistice，very much like that in the Korean peninsula. But this armistice would be more volatile because one party is one of the P-5 countries with the largest nuclear stockpile in the world.

I assume I know what Russia is going to do -- play with kind of a nuclear ambiguity，or make very serious nuclear threats in decades to come. Why is that? The reason is very simple. Because Russia's conventional force has declined tremendously compared to the cold war era. Unlike in 1982 when they actually announced no first-use on nuclear weapons，in 1993，they dropped this pledge because after the dissolution of Soviet Union，Russia is no longer as strong as before in conventional forces.

Then，what about China? First of all，I need to say something about China's friendship with Russia，which，described as “unlimited partnership”， alarms the whole West.

But for me，this kind of unlimited partnership is just a natural description of China’s good wish to develop friendship with its largest neighbor. Just think of this: If I say I want to develop my friendship with you，but then I say，hang on for a moment，this friendship has to be limited. What do you think? Let me give you another example. When we talk to Pakistanis，Pakistanis would often say China-Pakistan friendship is higher than the Himalayan mountain，deeper than the Arabian sea，and sweeter than honey. What would you do? You would smile，and probably nod your head，because you know that they mean no harm.

The second thing is，China is not a “decisive enabler of Russia” as NATO described. I know the West is not happy with China exporting a lot of items that might be dual use in nature. But when something is dual use in nature，first，we have to assume it is a civilian item rather than a military product. Just like oil and gas. Nobody considers oil and gas military products. But if it is put into the tank of a military truck，it could immediately become a military product. Therefore，when something is dual-use in nature，we have to assume it is for civilian use first.

China has indeed exported more things to Russia，partly because Russia being sanctioned needs more import from elsewhere，and partly because China of course wants to export more because Chinese economic growth has slowed down. But none of these exports is violating any international treaties. On Russia using nuclear weapons，I think in China，all people from ordinary Chinese people to Chinese leadership，the attitude is quite clear. I myself has written an opinion that was published in Financial Times ending with a sentence: don't use nuclear weapons，Mr. President. I know the good relationship between China and Russia，but I also know it is a decades-old firm Chinese policy of not using nuclear weapons first，and not use nuclear weapons against nuclear weapon free countries and zones.

In November 2022，President Xi told visiting German chancellor Olaf Scholz no use of nuclear weapons in Europe. Olaf Scholz’s visit to China was criticized by some people. He went back and said even for this consensus，his visit to China was worthwhile.

Then I need to say something about P-5 joint statement in 2022 before Russia's war in Ukraine. This is an old slogan coming from the cold war -- nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. But what is most interesting is that when President Xi Jinping visited Russia in March，2023 amid the war， again we had a joint statement between China and Russia in which this slogan was repeated. I think China has been trying its best in telling Russia not to use nuclear weapons. Otherwise，how could we have this joint statement? That means China is really trying hard to make its due contribution towards peace and stability in Europe. We don't know whether Russia will use nukes or not. But I think the attitude of China，India，and Brazil matters for Russia. And I hope it matters.

So I believe right now，President Putin probably is the most rational person in the Russian leadership，because he denied the possibility of using nuclear weapons when he was asked by Karaganov whether Russia should use it or not，he said no.

Now let me talk about China’s nuclear modernization. Reportedly，China has 500 nuclear warheads. And it has an ambition to increase this nuclear arsenal to 1,500 by 2035 according to the Pentagon. No one in China will confirm this number because this is considered a secret in China. But even if this is true， China’s nuclear arsenal is apparently still much smaller than that of the United States and Russia. Both of them have more than 5,000 nuclear warheads. For China to increase its nuclear arsenal，technically and economically，it is simple. China has technical know-how and China is the strongest industrial nation on earth. China’s economy is at least 10 times larger than Russia.

So what is impeding China from having more nuclear warheads? I believe that is because China believes it should not enter into a nuclear arms race. China’s defense budget tells more than anything about this. Why? Because I believe in international relations，there are two things that won't lie. Geography would not lie，because your operations would be very much constrained by geography，such as in Korean peninsula. People have been talking about how DPRK might launch a nuclear attack，but think of Korean peninsula，which is just 1200 kilometers in length. Given the nuclear radioactive dust that will surely linger on the peninsular，the question is in what kind of situation would the North Korean leader decide to launch a nuclear attack that is surely suicidal? Then，defense budget would not lie，because defense budget，whether you increase it or not，will tell your real assessment about the environment，about your self-confidence and about your adversaries or enemies.

China’s defense budget has been under 2 % for four decades. Basically，most of the time，it's around or even lower than 1.5 % of its GDP. This tells a lot about China. It tells China is confident about itself. It tells China is confident about the region. And it even tells China is confident about the China-U.S. relationship. China's confidence certainly matters，because if China is not confident，if it drastically increases defense budget like India and Japan，then the whole Asia-Pacific would be chaotic.

Then，let me try to explain what does “keeping the nuclear capabilities at the minimum level required for national security” mean. This is quoted in several Chinese defense white paper. What is the minimum level? My personal understanding is，no nuclear weapon states dare to launch a preemptive nuclear strike on China in spite of China’s no-first use of nuclear weapons. This in turn requires China to have adequate strength of deterrence.

Everybody knows that recently，China launched ICBM into the Southern Pacific. What does this mean? The Chinese press release didn't tell much，but I believe it is a boost of Chinese people's confidence in its own military. It is also a demonstration of China’s military capability. It also demonstrates that China would have to modernize its armed forces. I think modernization means new capabilities and reasonably increased quantity. If you just keep the same number，then you are just doing a maintenance job. China’s launch has been notified to the United States. The United States has expressed appreciation for this. This invited a question: would the United States also notify China about its nuclear activities or about its ICBM launches one day? Especially because China and the United States have actually signed agreement on mutual notification of major military activities. Then what are major military activities? Of course，China's launch of ICBM is one of them. What about the United States? Would you notify China what you are going to do in the South China sea? Or when your ships are going to sail through Taiwan Strait?

Perhaps it will be surprising for you to know that I am going to talk about the possibility of a nuclear war in the Taiwan Strait. The Chinese government still talks about peaceful unification. Even the American secretary of defense Lloyd Austin said at Shangri-La Dialogue a war is not imminent or inevitable. I'm happy he talked about this，because this is a direct denial of quite a few allegations from some American generals and admirals that China is about to attack Taiwan in 2025 or 2027，so on and so forth，because Austin should have talked with authority based on briefings，information and intelligence.

We certainly would not use nuclear weapons against our own people in Taiwan. This can hardly be imagined for any Chinese. But the question is，there are some Americans like former deputy assistant secretary Elbridge Colby，or some think tanks like Atlantic Council talking about United States using nuclear weapons first in Taiwan Strait，because they believe the US military is becoming inferior to the PLA in terms of conventional warfare. My answer is that we have to let the United States give up this crazy idea. And for that to happen，I think we have to increase some nuclear weapons so we can prevail in a conventional war against the United States in which the United States dare not use nuclear weapons against China first.

There are two myths on China’s nuclear policy. One is that China doesn't want talks on nuclear disarmament. You should have heard a lot about this. But my argument is that it really depends on what you want to talk to China. How about talking about Chinese proposal -- no first-use of nuclear weapons? China is more than willing to talk about this. But if you want to talk to China to find out the speed and scale of China’s nuclear modernization or development，probably you would become disappointed. Because for China and the US to talk about nuclear disarmament，there has to be a parity--either China has to drastically increases its nuclear stockpile，or the United States has to drastically decrease its nuclear stockpile to reach an equilibrium. None of them looks possible. The second myth is something most recent and most ridiculous，the so-called “nuclear employment guidance” of the United States. It is reported that the U.S. has to prepare for coordinated nuclear confrontation with China，Russia and North Korea simultaneously.

My question is，when have China，Russia and North Korea coordinated their nuclear weapons? I can hardly remember when China had a joint exercise with the North Korean military. How come we have coordinated our nuclear weapons? This is totally insane. People making a strategy based upon such insane analysis is crazy.

Then let me talk about what I believe is China-U.S. strategic stability. Strategic stability during the cold war refers to the equilibrium in nuclear weapons，but I believe between China and the U.S.，we can actually have a kind of strategic stability，not only on the number of warheads，but also including some new areas，that is cyber，AI and outer space.

I believe China and the US can afford to talk to each other in these three areas just because the gaps between the two sides are not so big in these areas. As I have proposed in my article in “Foreign Affairs”，in cyber，we should exchange a list of sensitive targets between China and U.S. that should not be attacked in any circumstances; In AI，we should make sure absolute human control over the command & control，especially the nuclear command & control system; and in outer space，we should discuss no-placement of weapons in outer space，as China and Russia have proposed. At the same time，we can also discuss what the West has proposed: to talk about rules and responsible behaviors.

Now let me come to the final part of what I am going to say-- Why I consider no-first use of nuclear weapons China proposed is affordable for all nuclear weapons states. This is what I have written recently in “Foreign Policy” magazine. Because I believe，first of all，there are two preconditions for us to talk about nuclear disarmament. First，it is impossible to ban nuclear weapons anytime soon. I know there is a treaty about prohibition of nuclear weapons in 2017 by non-nuclear weapons states. But none of the nuclear weapon states would wish to ban nuclear weapons now.

So it is impossible. Again，what is equally impossible is that the nuclear weapon states would wish to reduce their nuclear stockpiles amid ever intensifying competition. As I’ve just said， probably China would also have to reasonably increase its nuclear stockpile. But I believe with these two as preconditions，no first-use looks like the most realistic approach in reducing nuclear threats. Why is that? Simply put，it would not reduce your capabilities for retaliation，even if you promise no-first use. At the same time，you would enjoy moral high ground. Another reason is，I believe，after some studies，that American，British，and French nuclear policies actually are not so far away from China’s no first use. Let me come to each one of these countries.

For example，American’s recent nuclear policy has changed a bit，but until 2022，for example，in its nuclear posture review，it said that it would only consider the use of nuclear weapons in the extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests of the United States and its allies and partners. What confused me is the key word，“vital interests”. I just cannot imagine what kind of vital interests or interests of allies would require United States to use nuclear weapons first. Didn't the United States already use nuclear weapons first? What kind of interests are so important for United States that，having the strongest conventional forces and also one of the largest numbers of nuclear warheads，the US still would have to use nuclear weapons first? I know American allies are concerned. They want the United States to provide nuclear umbrella. But let me come back to the example，which I mentioned before.

Let's talk about the DPRK. DPRK would make threats from time to time.

But how likely would it be for them to really launch a nuclear attack? Because any use of nuclear weapons would be suicidal given the radioactive dust that would be lingering over Korean peninsula. So the right question is，in what kind of circumstances would DPRK decide to commit suicide? The answer is unless they believe they can no longer live，so they want to die with you. If we believe in the rationality of the DPRK leadership，then we do not need to worry about their first use of nuclear weapons.

The nuclear policy of UK is very much similar to that of the United States，because UK also talks about using nuclear weapons only in extreme circumstances of self-defense. And when we come to France，France has pledged to hold to a principle of strict sufficiency. This is why I have concluded that the nuclear policies of these countries actually are not that far away from China’s.

The biggest challenge is how to get Russia in. Actually，I would say Russia’s strategy to “escalate to deescalate” has worked in the war in Ukraine，because so far，the United States has still put some limits on what Ukraine can do with weapons that it has supplied. So how can Russia give it up to pledge no-first use? Because there is a dilemma of this strategy，because this strategy to “escalate to deescalate” depends on threats and fear of threats by other people. The point is，if people are threatened，they might become afraid. But if you really use nukes， you cannot control the scale of the retaliation by your adversaries，a tit-for-tat risks of becoming a full blown nuclear war that nobody wants. For Russia，it might just invite the involvement of NATO，the very thing that Moscow fears most if Russia really uses nuclear weapons.

This is why I suggest a kind of a dual track approach，my personal suggestion. In Europe，I suggest two steps for NATO. The first step is that NATO makes a unilateral no-first use pledge against Russia as a gesture of goodwill. Does NATO want to use nuclear weapons first against Russia? Never. So you can afford to make a unilateral no first use pledge. Because with this gesture，tensions can start to thaw.

Then the second step is a little bit bitter for NATO to swallow，but still affordable. That is NATO pledges to halt any further expansion of the alliance in exchange for Moscow to adopt no first use policy. NATO would say，why should I stop expansion when other countries want to join? My argument is that at least NATO’s expansion so far has a role in Russia’s response if it is not the whole reason because Russian leaders keep talking about it.

From another realistic point of view，right now there are only three countries on the waiting list to join NATO. That is Bosnia and Herzegovina，Georgia，and Ukraine. All these three countries have some troubled relationship with Russia，because they want to join NATO. Georgia and Ukraine，one had a war with Russia，another one is having a war with Russia. So these three countries’ entry into NATO would bring more trouble than benefit. Since there aren't other countries waiting to join，I believe it is affordable for NATO.

And then in Asia，China and Russia have already agreed to no first use against each other，apparently，because of the good relationship. But if China and the United States could reach a similar agreement，then it would deescalate a lot of potential conflicts involving American allies.

So the crucial point is whether China and the United States could reach a similar agreement. People might consider I am too naïve to believe that the United States would do that. But I don’t think I’m naive if I give you a lesson from history. India and Pakistan conducted nuclear tests in 1998. Very soon，China and the United States came to something which was so rare，that is， they quickly agreed to show solidarity between two nuclear powers，that is，to de-target their nuclear weapons at each other. In two years’ time，all the P5 countries have agreed on non-targeting in 2000.

The strong point of this agreement is that it is a good sign of the goodwill of the nuclear weapons states towards world nuclear disarmament. Even if non-targeting is not that significant，at least it's symbolic. The problem of non-targeting is it is not verifiable. How do you know if I’m targeting Russia or the United States or not? But I believe no first use is the natural step forward. Listen to this，non-targeting of nuclear weapons，what is the next step? Of course no-first use of nuclear weapons. I don't think no first use of nuclear weapons is lip service. Some people say China’s promotion of no first use is a kind of diplomatic ploy.

But then let me exaggerate to say，how about all of us join this “diplomatic poly”? Because this would become morally binding. Non-targeting is not verifiable，but no-first use is verifiable if you use nukes! No first use is good for the whole world. Finally，since all P-5 countries have agreed that a nuclear war cannot be won，why can't we pledge no-first use? Let me stop here and try my best to answer some of your questions. Thank you.

Comments: I agree very strongly no first use is a sort of logical step forward. But I doubt the United States will be willing to go along with this step by step process for the following reason.

It's already becoming clear in Europe. In my opinion，a public opinion is moving in favor of supporting negotiations to end the war whilst European political leaders are moving in the opposite direction.

Just to give one example，if I may. It was the European parliament resolution recently，which was passed，which called for，and I'm gonna quote， “support in every way possible for Ukraine's victory”. That's a sort of horrible blood curdling cry for a continuation of war，in my opinion.

So do you think the United States has an interest in maintaining the war in Ukraine. And I think that would be for two reasons. One is to prevent a bloc between China，Europe and Russia， which would make it considerably stronger than the United States，that's in the longer term.

And also，for that same end to foster bad relations between Germany and Russia and to encourage bad relations between Russia and China.

Zhou Bo:Thank you. I do understand that there are two kinds of people in supporting or opposing your views.

For example，Paul Krugerman，columnist of The New York Times，has actually said that supporting Ukraine would not cost much，but there are other people arguing the other way around. I believe right now，the United States is really struggling to find a solution，because it is actually involved in two wars. It believes that China is a “ pacing threat”，so they want to be focused on China. These two wars would definitely distract its attention.

So I don't think they want the war to continue，but as I said before，nobody knows how to end this war.

Sergey Batsanov( director of Pugwash，Geneva): It's an extremely interesting debate which has just started. I am a long-time enthusiast of no first use objective. I understand that there are many difficulties on the way to this idea. Obama tried to change the US policy from this particular aspect，just in the several last months before his departure from the White House. The common story is that he failed because the US allies objected to that.

Now，my analysis was even before that happened，that it was US military who arranged rejection of this Obama’s idea by the closest or some of the closest allies.

I think that we need to take into account a variety of factors，including new factors in order to prepare a solid or a more reliable base for making progress for no first use，including what you mentioned，when you discussed elements，important elements of strategic stability or sharing strategic stability between China and the US -- artificial intelligence，space and so on.

I would very strongly note that the new functions，new capabilities，or non-nuclear models，non nuclear forces，are becoming stronger and stronger factors that need to be addressed.

Now，one thing I need to correct. The debate in Russia about using nuclear weapons in Ukraine is a wrong description. Nobody is talking about using nuclear weapons in Ukraine，basically， except for some idiots，also high-level idiots. The question is about how to deter direct NATO involvement. To sum everything up，I think we need to move forward with the no first use; the idea I want to move，we need to start discussing seriously those ideas --how they work，starting with Track-II process，because Track-I has important limitations. I'm not saying it's impossible，but you have the limitations. And there is a need to clarify interests，preoccupations，objectives，steps，obstacles，and so on so forth. Thank you.

Zhou Bo:Thank you for your long comment. Since there are no questions，I wish not to respond.

Comments: Thanks very much. I've got two questions from Timothy Wright. He asked will a proposed no first use treaty encompasses change to a signatory’s respective force posture. If countries continue to have a launch on warning posture，for instance，nuclear war can still happen through miscalculation or accident. So he's asking if you think that political statement is sufficient，and secondly，China says it won't enter a nuclear arms race but it is expanding the number of the platforms and delivery vehicles. So he's arguing that all the signs are that China will continue to expand its capacities，and how does this align with Beijing’s position?

Zhou Bo: Let me come to the second question first. I think China's increase of nuclear weapons，if it really happens，would not be on a huge margin，therefore it would not be considered a nuclear arms race. Having more nuclear weapons，this is what I said，also means that China needs to modernize its nuclear forces because China would like to modernize all its military services，Rocket Force is also one of them. Now let me come to the first question. If all countries promise no first use，actually，you put yourself in the hands of the people around the world. People will see if you really honor your promise or not. If all nuclear weapons states say I won’t be the first to use，then this is a consensus that would be encouraging for non-nuclear weapons states. Just think of this，why should we need to use nuclear weapons first，especially for the United States which is the strongest nation on earth?

If an alliance is among a group of small，poor countries for self-defence，I understand it. But if this kind of alliance is among the strongest nations on earth，then I do not understand. If you are the strongest nation，people know the consequence if they attack you，you certainly have more than enough capabilities in retaliation. So why can't you promise no-first-use because it would not reduce your capabilities in retaliation. I know how difficult it is actually now for countries to adopt no first use. But I believe there could be a moment when political conditions are ripe. When we talk about non-targeting of nuclear weapons before 2000，there was also a voice in the United States which said，how can this be realistic? What I'm thinking about you is about your capability，not your gesture. But the Indo-Pakistan nuclear tests provide such a chance that the nuclear powers have to show a kind of solidarity. And nuclear powers have to show their opposition because their opposition is in line with NPT.

Comments: We have a few more questions. So one from Andrew，what would happen if a terrorist organization developed a nuclear weapon and threatened any of the world powers? How would no first use policy work then? David asks what assurances do you think China could or should give to US allies in East Asia about its intentions?

Zhou Bo：Well，about terrorists. First of all，do they have nuclear weapons? Or would they will use nuclear weapons first? Because if they use nuclear weapon first，if you retaliate，you are fully entitled to retaliate，right? So the genuine question actually is，how could you retaliate with nuclear weapons against a group of terrorists who could easily hide themselves somewhere? That is difficult to detect.

Let's talk about East Asia. Let's talk about China. Why in any circumstances would China launch a nuclear attack first on any countries? China claims large part of South China Sea，but so far， China has made no threats of using force at all toward any country in Southeast Asia. China is even negotiating a South China Sea code of conduct with ASEAN. Likewise，why would China want to use nuclear weapons against Japan which has no nuclear weapons? You can hardly give an example to say China has intention to use nuclear weapons against any country in East Asia.

The only example I gave just now is about DPRK which would make crazy remarks from time to time. But in reality，any launch of nuclear weapons，even small tactical nuclear bombs，is suicidal because the Korean Peninsula is too small. They，in spite of rhetoric，can hardly make this decision unless they want to commit suicide with someone. Then the question is why would they want to commit suicide? The answer is: unless they believe they could no longer live，so they want to die with you.

Comments: Thank you. Can you have a general comment on the relations between you and North Korea.

Zhou Bo：You see，there are so many debates about whether the North Korean leadership is rational or not. But if you look at what happened in the last 20 years，I think it is correct to say they have walked so fine on brinksmanship. Right? Brinksmanship requires a lot of the calculations，a lot of rationality-not something easily to be done，this is walking on a tight rope. So I would assume the leadership of DPRK is rational.

Comments: Thank you. I'm concerned，in a conflict over Taiwan，whether the conflict pressure would exceed this threshold，and we could still have nuclear war，and specifically in the context of non strategic nuclear weapons.

Zhou Bo：In China，there are some intermediate range missiles that are nuclear capable. That is true. But still，China has promised not to use nuclear weapons first against anyone.

We describe Taiwan people as our own compatriots. How can you imagine that we would use nuclear weapons against people whom we call “our compatriots in Taiwan”? It's totally unimaginable. I don't believe there is such a scenario，but what is dangerous is what I said just now. Some Americans including a former deputy assistant secretary of defense，and some think tanks openly ask the United States to use nuclear weapons in Taiwan Strait.

Now you can just google that very easily. Historically，they（ in the US）talked about using nuclear weapons against China. So I have to compare: when the West talked about Russia， they're just afraid Russia would use nuclear weapons. But when they talk about China，it seems that they are not afraid of China's smaller nuclear arsenal. Instead，they talk about using nukes first against the Chinese. So the simple logic for Chinese is that we have to increase our nuclear arsenal. And for us，as I mentioned before，it's just a political decision. Right? We are economically strong. We have technical know-how. We are the strongest industrial nation on earth. So I would say that the western countries should really congratulate themselves for China being so restraint until now.

Comments: let’s assume we did agree on a global no first use policy or even one bilaterally between the US and China. What do you see as the next step to build on that after a no first use policy has been agreed by all nuclear states?

Secondly，what about negative security assurances for non-nuclear weapons states? How does that play into this?

In spite of my proposal，I believe this is really the light at the end of the tunnel. It is dim light，it is not bright light. Yeah，it's difficult for us to do it，although I believe it is the right thing to do，and it is affordable for all nuclear weapon states.

Then I believe we have to discuss about the ways forward because in NPT，total nuclear disarmament is the goal of mankind.

Let me give you another example. I just briefly mentioned about our competition in outer space. China and Russia said no placement of any weapons in outer space. I think this makes a lot of sense. Don't we already have enough weapons on earth? Why should you place weapons in orbits? And which human folly is more monumental than places something in outer space to strike back on earth，our planet，our only homeland? But the United States and western countries just believe it is impossible not to place weapons in orbits.

They believe we can deploy them，but we need to discuss about responsible behaviors. But I still believe no placement of weapons in space is possible，because no West countries so far have described what they have deployed in space as a weapon.

So it would be much more relaxed if ordinary people think we do not have any weapons in outer space，because China and Russia's proposal comes from the Moon Treaty，but it is a step forward from Moon Treaty，which prohibits any placement of weapons in moon. If you don't place any weapons in moon，why would you place any weapon anywhere in orbit? If it is not for America’s desire for absolute supremacy，what is impeding Americans from doing so?

Comments: It strikes me that what worries China's neighbors is not so much its nuclear weapons，but its huge economic power. It's massive army，and it's what I would say is a kind of expansionist attitude in wanting to take over the South China Sea. It prevents the US from declaring no first use policy. Because it wants to preserve the right to prevent or deter China， say，from taking over the US allies. How do you feel about that?

Zhou Bo:First，I think it’s really a good thing for Chinese economy to become booming，for any Chinese like me. China's military is really growing. That is no doubt. But if you talk about the South China Sea，China is not impeding with any ships’ freedom of navigation in the South China Sea. There are 100,000 ships transiting through the South China Sea every year. Have you ever heard any complaint from the ships that China is impeding freedom of navigation? Yes，China has some territorial disputes with some ASEAN countries，but people forget one thing. These claimants have overlapping claims themselves. So it's not only between China and ASEAN countries. The problem is that China looks much bigger than these countries. Big is beautiful and small is adorable. People love things small，including baby cucumber，baby tomato. That is human instinct，not rationality. That is the only reason I can give.